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Abstract The qualitative theory of nomic truth approximation, presented in Kuipers
in his (from instrumentalism to constructive realism, 2000), in which ‘the truth’ con-
cerns the distinction between nomic, e.g. physical, possibilities and impossibilities,
rests on a very restrictive assumption, viz. that theories always claim to characterize
the boundary between nomic possibilities and impossibilities. Fully recognizing two
different functions of theories, viz. excluding and representing, this paper drops this
assumption by conceiving theories in development as tuples of postulates and models,
where the postulates claim to exclude nomic impossibilities and the (not-excluded)
models claim to represent nomic possibilities. Revising theories becomes then a mat-
ter of adding or revising models and/or postulates in the light of increasing evidence,
captured by a special kind of theories, viz. ‘data-theories’. Under the assumption that
the data-theory is true, achieving empirical progress in this way provides good rea-
sons for the abductive conclusion that truth approximation has been achieved as well.
Here, the notions of truth approximation and empirical progress are formally direct
generalizations of the earlier ones. However, truth approximation is now explicitly
defined in terms of increasing truth-content and decreasing falsity-content of theo-
ries, whereas empirical progress is defined in terms of lasting increased accepted and
decreased rejected content in the light of increasing evidence. These definitions are
strongly inspired by a paper of Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi and Roberto Festa,
viz., “Verisimilitude and belief change for conjunctive theories” (Cevolani et al. in
Erkenntnis 75(2):183–222, 2011).
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1 Philosophy of science, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
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1 Introduction
The idea of truthlikeness or verisimilitude amounts to the claim that one theory may
be closer, or more similar, to the truth than another. It was made an interesting topic
in the philosophy of science by Popper (1963), who presented a very plausible, but
failing explication of it. He proposed that ‘closer to the truth’ holds when the one
theory has more true and less false consequences than the other. Miller (1974) and
Tichý (1974) independently proved that a false theory, in the sense of a theory with at
least one false consequence, could according to Popper’s definition never be closer to
the truth than another one. Ever since, there have been developed other accounts that
circumvent this problem successfully. See Kuipers (1987) for an incomplete collection
of approaches. See Niiniluoto (1998) for an important survey and Oddie (2014) for
the most recent survey. Some global distinctions are in order. (1) Authors may put
the emphasis on a quantitative definition, based on a distance-from-the-truth measure,
notably Niiniluoto (1987), or on a qualitative definition of the comparative closer-to-
the-truth claim (e.g.Oddie 1986;Zwart 2001). It is important to note that in a qualitative
approach most theories will be incomparable, that is, in most cases one theory will
be neither closer, nor less close, to the truth than another. The advantage of such an
approach is that it focusses on safe cases of comparison, providing a sound point of
departure for concretizations, e.g. a quantitative approach. (2) As a rule, authors focus
on (truthlikeness with respect to) ‘the actual truth’, that is, the truth about what is (or
was) actually the case. However, from a philosophy of science point of view, one may
argue that scientists are aiming at theories that capture what is physically possible and
what is not. In other words, they are aiming at ‘the physical truth’ or, more broadly,
‘the nomic truth’, which makes nomic truthlikeness the topic of investigation. (3)
Finally, usually authors opt for a logical approach and conceive theories primarily as
sets of sentences or propositions, but one may also opt for a structuralist approach and
conceive theories primarily as sets of conceptual possibilities, represented by models
or, more generally, by set-theoretic structures.
The ‘nomic truth’ can perhaps best be illustrated by my favorite toy example of
theory oriented science (see Kuipers 2000, p. 143). To represent an electric circuit
with several switches and bulbs one may use a language with elementary propositions
that enable to indicate which switches are on and which are off and also to indicate
which bulbs give light and which do not. Several of the conceptually possible states
will be physically possible, and one of them will be the actual state.
Referring to Fig. 1, let pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 indicate that switch i is on ( ) and ¬pi
that it is off ( ). Let q(¬q) indicate that the bulb lights (does not light). It is assumed
that the bulb is not defective and that there is enough voltage. A possible state of the
circuit can be represented by a conjunction of negated and un-negated pi ’s. It is clear
that there is just one true description of the actual state of the circuit as it is depicted,
q&p1&¬p2&p3&p4, according to the standard propositional representation. Hence,
the example nicely illustrates, among others, that we consider ’the actual world’ pri-
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Fig. 1 An electric circuit
+ −
p1                   p2 q
p4
p3
marily as something partial and local, i.e., one or more aspects of a small part of the
actual universe. However, it need not be restricted to a momentary state, it may also
concern an actual trajectory of states in a certain time interval. In sum, the actual world
is the actual world in a certain context. To represent the physically possible states by
one proposition or theory one will have to design a complex proposition, the nomic
truth, in the above case:
q ↔ [(p1&p2) or p3]&p4
All states in which this proposition is true are physically possible, all others are not.
All propositions that can be formulated in the indicated language may be considered
as candidates for being this nomic truth and, at least intuitively, one proposition may
be closer to the truth than another, viz. when it captures more physically possible
states and less impossible ones. This may be a toy example for representing theory
oriented science, but in present day epigenetics there is a close analogy: in fact, genes
are considered as switches that may be on or off. However this may be, only the
general tenet of the example is relevant: theory oriented science is ultimately aiming
at characterizing what is e.g. physically, biologically or economically possible, and
theories are tested by experiments which are realizations of possibilities.
InKuipers (2000) I have presented a qualitative theory of nomic truth approximation
in a structuralist way, in which ‘the nomic truth’ is more specifically conceived of as
the true boundary between nomic, e.g. physical, biological, etc., possibilities and
impossibilities within a target domain and a theory amounts to a classification of all
conceptual possibilities as either nomically possible or nomically impossible. In the
basic form of my account, a theory is defined as closer to the truth than another when it
makes less classification mistakes, not merely in numbers, but in the strong sense that
all its classification mistakes are shared by the other theory, which makes in addition
some extra mistakes.
However, it recently turned out that the motivation of this formal definition is
based on a very restrictive, but unnecessary assumption, namely that theories give a
complete classification of all conceptual possibilities. InKuipers (2014b) I have shown
that the formal definition can already be motivated when a theory is only supposed
to claim that it includes all nomic possibilities, and hence that all its non-members
are nomic impossibilities. This new motivation is in terms of increasing truth-content
and decreasing falsity-content and is strongly stimulated by a paper of Cevolani et al.
(2011). Formally, it is not difficult to see that the formal definition can also bemotivated
in a similar way by assuming that a theory only claims that all its members are nomic
possibilities (instead of claiming that it includes all nomic possibilities).
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This paper exploits the possibility of dropping the restrictive assumption in a con-
ceptually very attractive way by combining both indicated ways. The resulting theory
of nomic truth approximation becomes conceptually in complete harmony with two
prima facie opposing functions of theories. On the one hand, there is the Popperian or
exclusion view that theories exclude certain (conceptual) possibilities from occurring
or being realizable. On the other hand, there is the inclusion or representation view that
theories represent, in relevant respects, certain possibilities as realized or realizable.1
The exclusion function is typically associated with speaking of the axioms, principles
or postulates of theories. They have to be satisfied and hence they exclude together
everything which does not satisfy them all. The representation function on the other
hand is typically associated with speaking of (specified) models of theories. Seen from
this perspective, I assume in Kuipers (2000) that the set of (representing) models of a
theory coincides with the set of models, in the formal sense, of the (excluding) postu-
lates of the theory. Although such a ‘maximal’ theorymay be the ultimate aim of nomic
theorizing, viz. the strongest true theory, it is not realistic to assume this of ‘theories in
development’. In sum, dropping the restrictive assumption makes it perfectly possible
to separate models and postulates, in order to fully recognize the twofold function of
theories in general and in aiming at truth approximation in particular.
Hence, in this paper a theory will in general be taken as ‘non-maximal’ in the
following two-sided sense, viz. as a combination of a set of Models and a set of
Postulates, where the former have to satisfy the latter, but need not exhaust the set
of models of the joint Postulates. It will be convenient to represent the Postulates by
the set of all its models: models (Postulates). Hence, a theory becomes a tuple of the
following form:
<M, P> with P = models(Postulates) and M(odels) being a subset of P
This two-sided approach to theories can do justice to three different views in philos-
ophy of science, viz. theorizing is mainly a matter of (1) formulating and revising
postulates, or (2) designing and redesigning models, or (3) the two-sided combination
of them. The generalized theory of truth approximation to follow will provide addi-
tional support for the two-sided view, but will leave room for both one-sided views.
It is important to note, as an aside, that the two-sided view on theories is also in
perfect agreement with the hypothetical-deductive (HD) and deductive-nomological
(DN) views on prediction and explanation, respectively. For the prediction and expla-
nation of an event we start with representing (modelling) the situation in the relevant
terms, as far as possible, but without the crucial event. This is derived by applying
the relevant postulates, which amounts to completing or closing the model as far
as required. Hence, prediction and explanation naturally appear as co-production of
(partial) models and postulates, that is, of representation and exclusion.
The generalized theory of truth approximation presented below is based on the two-
sided view on theories and technically reduces to that of Kuipers (2000) by assuming
M=P throughout. The representation claimwill be associatedwithM and the exclusion
claim with P. Truth approximation is construed in terms of increasing truth-content
1 The representation by theories in developmentwill usually be in an approximateway, due to idealizations.
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and decreasing falsity-content of the claims by adding or revising models and/or
postulates in the light of increasing evidence. The generalized theory further fol-
lows Kuipers (2000) in reconstructing evidence as a ‘data-theory’ based on realized,
hence nomic, possibilities and inductive generalizations based on them (and implying
induced impossibilities). The evidence will guide the comparative assessment of the
success of theories and the subsequent planning of new experiments to be performed
leading to increasing evidence. Ultimately, the comparative success assessment may
give good reasons not only for the inductive conclusion that empirical progress has
been made by a revised version of the theory relative to the original one but even for
the abductive conclusion that it is closer to the truth than the original and hence that
truth approximation has been achieved.
We start with presenting an example of a two-sided theory (Sect. 2) and then outline
the essentials of any theory of (nomic) truth approximation (Sect. 3). A relatively
detailed presentation of the generalized theory follows (Sects. 4–7), with emphasis on
what is conceptually new relative to Kuipers (2000). We close by indicating a number
of perspectives on concretization, an alternative interpretation, and a link with belief
revision (Sect. 8).
2 An example of a two-sided theory
The following, simplified, example illustrates the idea of a two-sided theory. Newton’s
theory can be represented on the one hand by the three laws of motion, i.e. by its
(general) postulates, and on the other by various sets of models, e.g. (cpm-)models
of classical particles mechanics (cpm) and models of classical rigid body mechanics,
with specific sub-classes.
Focusing on the set or universe of conceptually possible systems of classical parti-
cle mechanics, Ucpm, the general postulates determine together the set of all models
satisfying them, Pcpm (⊆Ucpm). Various sub-classes of Pcpm are based on specific
assumptions about the nature of such systems, notably so-called special force laws,
e.g. the set of models Pgcpm satisfying the law of gravitation, but also on many system
specific assumptions. Hence, a specific model for a specific system is built up by start-
ing bottom-upwith system specific details and is top-down completed by applying the
general and the special postulates, here called the GSP-closure of the model. Such
a specific model may or may not be generalized to a subset of models for a specific
subtype of cpm-systems.2 For example, let Mfo indicate the GSP-closure of objects
of medium size and weight, falling from a medium distance on the earth.3
As soon as a particular model is claimed to represent a particular system (e.g a
falling brick) it predicts behavior of the system in accordance with that model.4 If that
2 Note that such a set is comparable to a set of exemplars in Kuhn’s sense or a set (of GSP-closures of
tentative representations) of the intended applications in Sneed’s sense.
3 Subsets of Pcpm corresponding to systems with different kinds of forces may overlap, notably in the
case of two kinds of forces, but they need not exhaust Pcpm, e.g. there may be room for as yet unknown
(formally different) kinds of forces.
4 This also provides a potential explanation of that behavior, where, in agreement with the DN-model of
explanation, the bottom-up data function as initial conditions and the postulates as laws.
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Fig. 2 The classical theory of
gravitational particle mechanics






model is disconfirmed some specific (bottom-up) assumption may have to be revised,
but if similar models for similar systems are also disconfirmed, the whole relevant
class of particular models may have to be revised, e.g. by revising the particular
force law (top-down). In this way we see that revising a two-sided theory may be a
matter of adding or revising postulates that exclude things (top-down) or of adding or
revising models that are supposed to represent and hence to be included (bottom-up),
or both.
Let us now assume that there is a sharp, but not yet specified, distinction or boundary
between the set Tgpm of physically possible systems of gravitational particle mechan-
ics, as represented inUcpm, and the set of physically impossible systemsof gravitational
particle mechanics, that is, the complement of Tgpm. Figure 2 illustrates the four sub-
sets of Ucpm introduced: Pcpm, the subset Pgcpm, and the latter’s subset Mfo, and finally
the, unknown, target set Tgpm.
Now we may reconstruct truth approximation as a matter of aiming at establishing
the true boundary between nomic possibilities and impossibilities, or the truth about
such a boundary, in the present case, starting from the two-sided theory<Mfo, Pgcpm>
with the claimMfo ⊆ Tgpm ⊆ Pgcpm, and revising it by adding or revising the models
and/or adding or revising the postulates in the light of increasing evidence, with the
ideal end the ‘maximal and true’ or the strongest true theory<M#, P#>, i.e. the theory
for which M# = Tgpm = P#.
3 Outline of a theory of (nomic) truth approximation
The paper is set up by following the cornerstones of any theory of truth approximation
as developed in Kuipers (2000) and enriched by Cevolani et al. (2011) and Cevolani
et al. (2013).
I Initial step: description of the target
• Assuming a domain of research and a vocabulary, clarify the target you are
aiming at, that is, about which you aim to approach the truth.
• Here, the target is the nomic truth, i.e. which conceptual possibilities are nom-
ically possible in the domain of research and which are not.
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II Logico-semantic steps: define closer to the truth (greater verisimilitude or truth-
likeness)
• Define your notion of theory, which we did already, and define next the notion
of true (false) theories and hence of the strongest true theory, i.e. the truth.
• Define the notions of the truth-content and the falsity-content of a theory.
• Define closer to the truth in terms of suitably specified notions of a larger
truth-content and a smaller, or otherwise less problematic, falsity-content.
III Epistemological steps: define more successful
• Identify the kind of evidence that experiments provide, up to and including
inductive generalizations.
• Assuming that the evidence is accepted, define the therewith accepted content
(or the successes) and rejected content (or the failures) of a theory.
• Define more successful in terms of a larger accepted content and a smaller, or
otherwise less problematic, rejected content.
IV Theoretical step: from verisimilitude to success
• Assuming the truth of the (accepted) evidence, prove the strongest ‘success
theorem’. Ideally this theorem amounts to: ‘closer to the truth’ unconditionally
entails ‘at least as successful’ and in the long run even ‘more successful’.
V Methodological steps: from success to verisimilitude
• Assuming that a new theory is at a certain moment more successful than the
old one, propose and test the empirical progress hypothesis: the new theory (is
and) remains more successful than the old one.
• Assuming that after ‘sufficient confirmation’5 the empirical progress hypoth-
esis is accepted (for the time being), argue on the basis of the success theorem
that the best explanation for this case of empirical progress is the truth approx-
imation hypothesis that the new theory is closer to the truth than the old one,
i.e. that this is a case of truth approximation.
• Abductively conclude (for the time being) that the new theory is closer to the
truth than the old one, i.e. that truth approximation has been achieved.
In this paper I will put the formal emphasis on steps II and III, corresponding to Sects. 5
and 6, because they are conceptually new, whereas essentially similar versions of the
remaining steps have been elaborated in Kuipers (2000). Sections 4 and 6.1 introduce
the crucial points of departure from Kuipers (2000) regarding the target of nomic
research and of how evidence is conceived, respectively.
4 I Initial step: description of the target
Let U indicate the set of conceptual possibilities in a given context (e.g. the possible
states, trajectories or transformations6 of a system, or possible kinds of systems),
5 What sufficient confirmation is, is of course a matter of taste and may hence be a matter of debate.
6 Deutsch (2013) is drawing attention, in terms of ‘constructor theory’, to the importance in physics and
elsewhere of the distinction between possible and impossible ‘transformations’. In these terms, the present
paper is dealingwith two-sided truth approximation regarding the true boundary between nomically possible
and nomically impossible (but conceptually possible) transformations.
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Fig. 3 The set of conceptual
possibilities U and the
(unknown) subset of nomic
possibilities T
U           cT
T
generated by a descriptive vocabulary V in which U is characterized as V’s set of set-
theoretic structures, and in which subsets of U, e.g. X, Y, R, S, can be characterized.
Complements of sets will be indicated by a preceding ‘c’: e.g. cX. By the way, U
should not to be taken as a set of possible worlds in the standard ‘there is only one,
all-inclusive, world’ sense. Our possibilities are relative to a certain context or (type
of) system(s), sometimes called ‘small worlds’. They are only mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive in the same case in the given context, e.g. in one state of a system.
In this respect they can best be compared with the possible ‘elementary outcomes’
of an experiment in probability theory, e.g. throwing a die: although the six faces
are mutually exclusive (and jointly exhaustive) in one experiment, they are not when
different experiments are considered. However, there is also an important difference:
insteadof the six faces, not all our conceptual possibilities are supposed to bephysically
possible.
Let (bold) T indicate the subset of nomic, e.g. physical, possibilities, and hence
cT the subset of nomic impossibilities. By the bold ‘T’ we indicate that we do not
(yet) dispose of a characterization of it in terms of V, see the dashed ellipse in Fig. 3.
The target of research is identifying, if possible, T’s boundary in V-terms, indicated
by (non-bold) T, hence T=T, assuming such a characterization exists, which I will do
throughout in this paper. T will be called ‘the (explicit) (nomic) truth’, for reasons that
will become clear.
5 II Logico-semantic steps: define closer to the truth
5.1 Theories, their claims, and ‘the truth’
For the logico-semantic steps we start with defining the notion of theories. In the
present nomic context, theories are intended to (at least partially) characterize T.
Recall that for that purpose a theory is conceived as a tuple <M, P> of subsets of U,
defined in V-terms, with P = Models (Postulates) and the claims:
“M ⊆ T”, the inclusion or representation claim: all members of M are nomic
possibilities,
“T ⊆ P”, i.e. “cP ⊆ cT”, the exclusion claim: all non-members of P are excluded
from being nomic possibilities (are nomic impossibilities), or, equivalently, no
nomic possibility is excluded by the postulates of the theory.
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The members of M are called the models of the theory and those of P the models of
the postulates of the theory.7
A theory is consistent if M ⊆ P, i.e. when its two claims are compatible; it is
inconsistent otherwise. Note that this notion of inconsistency is not the standard logical
one, but here plausible and of course related.8 This paper is restricted to consistent
theories, leaving inconsistent ones for a future paper, for they seem interesting as well.
A theory ismaximal if M=P; it is non-maximal otherwise. Kuipers (2000) is restricted
to maximal theories. Maximal theories in this sense seem also characteristic for the
model-theoretic and structuralist9 or semantic view on theories.
It will be useful to also define two other extreme kinds of theories, besides maximal
ones, so-called pure (or one-sided) theories. A theory <M, P> is a pure theory of
postulates, or a pure exclusion theory, if M = ∅ and it is a pure theory of models,
or a pure inclusion theory, if P=U. In these terms, a (non-pure or two-sided) theory
<M, P> is a combination of a pure theory of models <M, U> and a pure theory of
postulates <∅, P>, also called the M-side (or inclusion) theory and the P-side (or
exclusion) theory, respectively.
Finally, a theory <M, P> is true if both claims are true, i.e. M ⊆ T ⊆ P, false
otherwise. Now it is easy to see that there is at most one maximal or strongest true
theory, called the true (nomic) theory or simply the (nomic) truth, viz. the one for
which M=T=P. From now on, ‘the truth’ will refer to ‘the nomic truth’, except when
otherwise stated. It results from the characterization of T in V-terms, if it exists. It
will be indicated by <T, T>, or simply T, with non-bold ‘T’. This T is the target of
(theory-oriented) research.
It is also easy to check that there is at most one strongest true pure theory of models,
viz. <T, U> and that there is at most one strongest true pure theory of postulates,
viz. <∅,T>. Hence, <T, T> is the strongest true (two-sided) theory.
5.2 Truth- and falsity-content
In view of the two claims of a theory it is plausible how to define the truth-content and
the falsity-content of a theory. Consider the M-side claim M ⊆ T. As far as M ∩ T
7 Although we suggest that P is determined as the set of models of a given set of postulates, and M is just
given as a set of members of U, it may well be that in some contexts both P and M are directly specified
as subsets of U. Alternatively, whereas P may be based on a set of exclusion postulates, M may be based
on a set of inclusion postulates. However, I prefer to speak of models because the term ‘model’ suggests to
represent something and hence to be included in some target set, whereas the term ‘postulate’ suggests to
exclude things by imposing a necessary condition to be satisfied in order to be included.
8 A theory is inconsistent in the syntactic (logical) sense when it is possible to derive a contradiction or in
the semantic (logical), but equivalent, sense when there is no model satisfying it.
9 In the first view, the postulates (or axioms) are explicitly formulated in a specified language and the
models are those structures of the language that satisfy all of them. In the second view, the language is
not specified but the models are directly specified in such a way that the postulates are built into them.
Note that in the basic format of a theory in the structuralist sense <Mp,M, I>, Mp corresponds with our
U, M with our M and P, with M=P, and I with T. As suggested, both views on theories seem to conceive
them as maximal. However, one may also argue that they are purely dealing with an exclusion claim, viz.
(T =)I ⊆ M(= P), in the structuralist case.
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Table 1 Truth- and
falsity-content
Theory <M, P> M-side P-side
M- resp. P-claim M ⊆ T T ⊆ P (cP ⊆ cT)
Truth-content (TC) M ∩ T cP ∩ cT
Falsity-content (FC) M − T cP − cT
M- resp. P-content M cP
Fig. 4 Truth- and
falsity-content. The indicated
intersections constitute the
relevant truth-content and the
indicated difference sets the
relevant falsity-content
U
P        M




is concerned the sub-claim M ∩ T ⊆ T is true and as far as M − T is concerned the
remaining sub-claim M−T ⊆ T is false. Hence we define M∩T as its truth-content
and M−T as its falsity-content. Note that their union equals M, which can be seen as
the (total) content of the M-side claim.
Similarly, regarding the P-side claim T ⊆ P, that is, cP ⊆ cT, the sub-claim
cP ∩ cT ⊆ cT is true and the additional sub-claim cP − cT ⊆ cT is false. Hence
we define cP ∩ cT as its truth-content and cP − cT as its falsity-content. Their union
equals cP, in which Popper’s idea of the empirical content can be recognized easily:
the set of possibilities which are excluded by the postulates. Table 1 summarizes these
definitions.
In combination with Table 1 and Fig. 4 makes graphically clear which subsets are
involved.
5.3 Closer to the truth (greater verisimilitude or truthlikeness)
The notions of truth- and falsity-content just defined allow for a straightforward defini-
tion of “closer to the truth” in terms of greater truth-content and smaller falsity-content.
Focusing first on pure M-side theories, for example, one can define:
<M∗,U> is at least as close to the truth as the M-side theory <M, U> iff
TC-clause: the truth-content of <M, U> is a subset of the truth-content of
<M∗, U> and
FC-clause: the falsity-content of <M∗, U> is a subset of the falsity-content of
<M, U>
A similar definition can of course be given for pure P-side theories.
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Table 2 <M∗, P∗> is at least as close to the truth as <M, P>
<M∗, P∗> is at least as close
to the truth as <M, P>
M-side P-side
TC-clauses:
TC is a subset of TC*
M ∩ T ⊆ M∗ ∩ T
≡ T−M∗ ⊆ T−M
cP ∩ cT ⊆ cP∗ ∩ cT
≡ P∗ − T ⊆ P − T
≡ P∗ ∪ T ⊆ P ∪ T
FC-clauses:
FC* is a subset of FC
M∗ − T ⊆ M − T cP∗ − cT ⊆ cP − cT
≡ T − P∗ ⊆ T − P
≡ P ∩ T ⊆ P∗ ∩ T
Combined clauses M∗T ⊆ MT cP∗cT ⊆ cPcT
Table 2 presents the combined definition of “<M∗, P∗> is at least as close to the
truth as <M, P>”.
It is not difficult to check that the four single clauses are independent as long as the
theories are non-maximal. Moreover, as indicated, on both sides the two single differ-
ence clauses can be combined into the corresponding combined symmetric-difference
clauses. It is easy to check that for maximal theories (M=P) the two combined clauses
are formally equivalent10,11.
Figure 5 illustrates “<M∗, P∗> is at least as close to the truth as <M, P>”. In
combination with Table 2 the separated figures make graphically clear by shading
which subsets have to be empty at the M-side (left) and at the P-side (right). Of
course, the figures have to be conceived as combined, taking into account that M ⊆ P
and M∗ ⊆ P∗. Hence, there will appear single and double shaded subareas.
Although the two figures look formally similar, it is important to note that corre-
sponding shaded areas are empty due to ‘opposite’ clauses. E.g. in the left figure
the shaded area on the left is empty due to the TC-clause for the M-side, viz.
M ∩ T ⊆ M∗ ∩ T, whereas in the right figure it is empty due to the FC-clause
for the P-side, viz. cP∗ − cT ⊆ cP − cT, or, equivalently T − P∗ ⊆ T − P.
It is also not difficult to check that the P-side can be summarized by ‘having at least
as many true consequences (for P∗ ∪T is included in P∪T12) and correctly allowing
10 The symmetric difference AB is standardly defined as (A − B) ∪ (B − A).
11 This leads to the original ‘symmetric difference’- definition (Miller 1978; Kuipers 1982), assuming
the strong claim of maximal theories: M=P=T. By the way, Miller’s definition was focused on ‘the actual
truth’, i.e. one particular possibility. However, both share the characteristic that they are intuitively similar
to Popper’s original but faulty definition in terms of more true and less false consequences. The symmetric
difference definition for maximal theories may be summarized as: (1) more correctly and less incorrectly
included possibilities (as nomic) or, equivalently, (2) more correctly and less incorrectly excluded possi-
bilities (from being nomic). In the generalized theory, applied to non-maximal theories, (1) characterizes
‘closer to’ on the M-side, and (2) on the P-side.
12 A true consequence of <M, P> at the P-side can be represented as a superset of both P and T, i.e. a
set having both P and T as subsets, for the following reason. Let P, T, and C (subset of U) represent the
models of the (complex) sentences p, t, and c, respectively, and let P ∪ T ⊆ C. Then c is a consequence of
p and of t, and hence a true consequence of p, for c is true in all models of P and T. The condition that
P∗ ∪ T is included in P ∪ T now guarantees that all supersets of P ∪ T are supersets of P∗ ∪ T, and hence
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Fig. 5 <M∗, P∗> is at least as close to the truth as <M, P>: shaded areas are empty
at least as many possibilities (P∗ ∩ T includes P ∩ T) and, conversely, the M-side by
‘having at least as many correct models (M∗ ∩T includes M∩T) and allowing at least
as many true consequences (for M∗ ∪ T is included in M ∪ T)’.
Finally, it is plausible to define ‘closer to the truth’ if, in addition to ‘at least as close
to the truth’, at least one of the four required single set-theoretic inclusions can be
replaced by a proper inclusion and hence if at least one of the two required combined
inclusions in terms of symmetric differences is proper.
6 III Epistemological steps: define more successful
6.1 Empirical data
So far, we have been engaged with the logical problem of verisimilitude, that is, expli-
cating ‘closer to the truth’, assuming that we dispose of the truth in one way or another.
Now we turn to the epistemological problem of specifying empirical conditions that
support the conclusion, at least for the time being, that one theory is closer to the
unknown truth than another. As we will see, empirical progress is such a condition.
In the nomic context the empirical data are asymmetric in the following sense (cf.
Kuipers 2000, p. 157). We can establish by experiments nomic possibilities. In fact,
every experiment realizes by definition a nomic possibility. However, it is evident that
we cannot establish nomic impossibilities in such a direct way. But in the empirical
sciences we use to ‘induce’ nomic impossibilities indirectly by inductive (empirical)
generalizations that we accept, for the time being, on the basis of ‘sufficient’ experi-
mentation, notably by trying to realize counterexamples. For example, the observation
of a black raven is the realization of a nomic possibility, whereas concluding that non-
black ravens do not exist is an inductive generalization, viz. all ravens are black.
Footnote 12 continued
that all true consequences of <M, P> (at the P-side) are (true) consequences of <M∗, P∗>. For a detailed
comparison between Popper’s failing consequence-based approach and the ‘model-based’ approach, both
for maximal theories, the reader is referred to Kuipers (2000, Chap. 8.1), where the latter is also translated
in terms of consequences, leading to the identification of Popper’s bad luck.
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Fig. 6 Data-theory <R, S>
depicted as a true theory U
R T S
We indicate the (asymmetric) data at a certain moment by <R, S>, where R indi-
cates the set of realized nomic possibilities (e.g. realized physical possibilities) and
S indicates the strongest law induced on the basis of R, more precisely, the set of
conceptual possibilities that are not excluded by (the combination of) the accepted
inductive generalizations. In this setup cS indicates the set of induced nomic impossi-
bilities. Of course, we may always assume that R ⊆ S, for, if not, any element in R-S
would represent a realized counterexample to S and hence to at least one of its consti-
tuting inductive generalizations. Moreover, if the experiments are correctly described
by R (relative to the vocabulary) and if, in addition, S is correctly induced, we may
conclude that R ⊆ T ⊆ S, whatever T is. Hence, we not only assume that <R, S> is
a theory, a ‘data-theory’, but by accepting it we even assume that it is a true theory,
that is, we have accepted the claims R ⊆ T and T ⊆ S (≡ cS ⊆ cT). Of course,
the correctness assumptions are very substantial, in particular that of correct inductive
generalizations.
Figure 6 displays <R, S> as a true theory.
6.2 Accepted and rejected content
To get plausible definitions of accepted and rejected content of a theory<M, P> in the
light of an accepted data-theory <R, S> we have to confront the claims of the former,
that is, M ⊆ T and cP ⊆ cT, with the accepted claims of the latter, that is, with
the claims R ⊆ T and cS ⊆ cT. Let us first look at the M-side. Of the theory claim
M ⊆ T, recall, with content M, we have, by accepting R ⊆ T, accepted the sub-claim
M ∩ R ⊆ T, and hence the accepted M-content is M ∩ R, which may be called the
set of realized examples.13 However, by accepting cS ⊆ cT, we have also rejected the
sub-claimM∩ cS ⊆ T, and hence the rejected M-content is M∩ cS(= M−S), which
may be called the set of induced counterexamples.
Similarly for the P-side. Of the theory claim cP ⊆ cT, recall, with content cP,
we have, by accepting cS ⊆ cT, accepted the sub-claim cP ∩ cS ⊆ cT, and hence
the accepted P-content is cP ∩ cS, which may be called the set of induced examples.
However, by accepting R ⊆ T, we have also rejected the sub-claim cP ∩ R ⊆ cT,
13 This and the following ‘(counter-) example terminology’ is a variation of similar terminology in Kuipers
(2000, p. 158).
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Table 3 Accepted and rejected M- and P-content of theory <M, P> in the light of accepted data-theory
<R, S>
<M, P> in the light of
<R, S>
M-side P-side
M- resp. P-claim M ⊆ T T ⊆ P (cP ⊆ cT)
Accepted claims R ⊆ T
T ⊆ S(cS ⊆ cT)
M-resp. P-content (of the
theory)
M cP
Accepted (M- resp. P-)
content
1: M ∩ R
realized examples
(true positives)
4: cP ∩ cS
induced examples
(true negatives)
Rejected (M- resp. P-)
content










3: M − (R ∪ cS) 6: cP − (R ∪ cS)
and hence the rejected P-content is cP ∩ R(= R − P), which may be called the set of
realized counterexamples.
Table 3 gives a full survey, adding the also plausible terminology of ‘true and false
positives (negatives)’,14 the undecided content on both sides,15 and a numbering of
the most relevant subsets.
Figure 7 illustrates all these concepts graphically, using the numbering of subsets
in Table 3.
6.3 At least as successful relative to <R, S>
It is rather plausible to define now the idea that (the revised or new) theory<M∗, P∗>
is at least as successful as (the initial) theory<M, P>, relative to accepted data-theory
<R, S>, by requiring, that all successes (realized and induced examples) of <M, P>
are successes of <M∗, P∗> and all failures (induced and realized counterexamples)
of <M∗, P∗> are failures of <M, P>. Or, equivalently, at least as much accepted
content (AC-clauses) and at most as much rejected content (RC-clauses) of the *-
theory on both sides, of course, not in terms of numbers but of subset conditions. The
result is given in Table 4.
14 True (false) positives are truly (falsely) claimed nomic possibilities, true (false) negatives are truly
(falsely) claimed nomic impossibilities. This terminology assumes that we take the claim that an item in
U is a nomic possibility as the claim to be ‘a positive (result)’ and that it is a nomic impossibility as the
claim to be ‘a negative (result)’. Now, for example, regarding the members of M∩R, theory <M, P> truly
claims that they are positives, hence they may be called ‘true positives’.
15 The undecided M-content is that part of the content of M about which <R, S> is silent, that is, the
M-content apart from its accepted and rejected parts: ‘M-content − (accepted M-content ∪ rejected M-
content)=M − [(M ∩ R) ∪ (M ∩ cS)] = M − (R ∪ cS). Similarly for the undecided P-content.
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Fig. 7 Accepted and rejected M- and P-content of theory <M, P> in the light of accepted data-theory
<R, S>. See Table 3 for the legend. Note It may be interesting to note that P-S represents the wrongly not
excluded nomic impossibilities, of which the subset M-S represents the wrongly included nomic impossi-
bilities
Table 4 <M∗, P∗> is at least as successful as <M, P>, relative to <R, S>
<M∗, P∗> is at least as
success-ful as <M, P>,
relative to <R, S>
M-side P-side
AC-clauses: AC is a
subset of AC*
M ∩ R ⊆ M∗ ∩ R
≡ R − M∗ ⊆ R − M
all realized examples of
<M, P> are examples
of <M∗, P∗>
cP ∩ cS ⊆ cP∗ ∩ cS
≡ P∗ − S ⊆ P − S
all induced examples of
<M, P> are examples
of <M∗, P∗> a
RC-clauses: RC* is a
subset of RC






cP∗ − cR ⊆ cP − cR






a Since the clause is also equivalent to S ∪ P∗ ⊆ S ∪ P it can also be paraphrased by “all induced laws
entailed by <M, P> are entailed by <M∗, P∗>, for any superset of S∪ P is a superset of S∪ P∗. See Note
12
Of course, ‘more successful’ is defined by requiring, in addition, that at least one
of the four single clauses is a proper inclusion.
7 Remaining steps: from verisimilitude to success, and vice versa
At this point we just repeat the remaining steps in setting up a theory of nomic truth
approximation and briefly give some particular features of the specific case.
IV Theoretical step: from verisimilitude to success
• Assuming the truth of the (accepted) evidence, prove the strongest ‘success
theorem’. Ideally this theorem amounts to: ‘closer to the truth’ unconditionally
entails ‘at least as successful’ and in the long run even ‘more successful’.
In the present case it is not difficult to check that ‘ideally’ applies, i.e. if
<M∗, P∗> is closer to the truth than<M, P> and if the data-theory<R, S> is
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true, this entails that<M∗, P∗> is at least as successful as<M, P> relative to
<R, S>, and, under some probabilistic test assumptions,16 that it will become
more successful in the long run.
V Methodological steps: from success to verisimilitude
• Assuming that a new theory is at a certain moment more successful than an
old one, propose and test the empirical progress hypothesis: the new theory (is
and) remains more successful than the old one.
Note that the two claims of a theory lead to different kinds of predictions:
whereas the “T⊆ P” claim leads to ‘this is impossible’ (hence, ‘that must
happen’) predictions, the “M ⊆ T”-claim leads to ‘this is possible / may
happen’-predictions. With plausible consequences for differential predictions
between <M, P> and <M∗, P∗>.
• Assuming that after ‘sufficient confirmation’ the empirical progress
(EP-)hypothesis is accepted (for the time being), which is an inductive con-
clusion, argue on the basis of the success theorem that the best explanation
for this case of empirical progress is the truth approximation (TA-) hypothesis
that the new theory is closer to the truth than the old one, i.e. that this is a case
of truth approximation.
The reverse (‘from success to verisimilitude’) consequences of the success
theorem, i.e. the consequences of that theorem in view of an accepted EP-
hypothesis (and the data-theory onwhich it is based), are such that this situation
not only suggests the TA-hypothesis, they also justify it to a substantial extent:
If <M∗, P∗> is, in view of <R, S>, accepted as empirically progressive
relative to <M, P>, then
1. the success theorem not only makes it perfectly possible that <M∗, P∗> is
closer to the truth than<M, P>, due to it theTA-hypothesiswould even explain
the greater success,
2. it is impossible that <M∗, P∗> is further from the truth than <M, P> (and
hence <M, P> closer to the truth than <M∗, P∗>), for otherwise, so shows
the success theorem, <M∗, P∗> could not be more successful,
3. it is also possible that <M∗, P∗> is neither closer to nor further from the truth
than <M, P>, in which case, however, another specific explanation has to be
given for the fact that <M∗, P∗> has so far proven to be more successful, e.g.
due to a biased choice of experiments.
Note that the TA-hypothesis provides a typical default explanation of EP, that
is, an adequate explanation unless there turns out to be reason for another diag-
nosis. The third reverse consequence provides the room for ‘unless’ conditions
16 E.g. suppose U is finite and let<M∗, P∗> be closer to the truth than<M, P> (partly) due to the ‘strong’
TC-clause (see Table 2) that M ∩ T is a proper subset of M∗ ∩ T. If R results from random sampling in
T, sooner or later one of the extra items in M∗ ∩ T (i.e. items in (M∗ ∩ T) − M) will show up, proving
‘more successful’. Similarly, for the possible strong TC-clause on the P-side and the two possible strong
FC-clauses.
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and hence for future ‘divided success’, i.e. the old theory may get extra suc-
cesses relative to the new one. For example, the experiments so far may turn
out to have been biased in favor of the new theory, and hence new experiments
breaking this bias may turn out to be in favor of the old one.
• Abductively conclude (for the time being) that the new theory is closer to the
truth than the old one, i.e. that truth approximation has been achieved.
This final stepwill nowbe no surprise. In fact, it is a special case of a sophisticated
form of ‘inference to the best explanation’ or ‘inference to the best theory’, viz.
not as a, or even the, true theory, but as the theory which is the closest to the truth
of the available theories. Of course, ’inference to the best theory’ should be read
as: inference to the best theory of all available theories beyond the data-theory
<R, S>.17
8 Perspectives
To be sure, the above analysis is based on the simplest assumptions about the further
nature of theories and their claims, for which reason I call it the basic version of
the generalized theory. In this section I will briefly indicate four perspectives for
concretization, as far as relevant, in line with those of Kuipers (2000). I will conclude
with indicating an alternative interpretation and a connection with belief revision.
8.1 Refinement, capturing idealization and concretization
There are two plausible qualitative concretizations of the basic version of the two-sided
approach, refinement and stratification (cf. Kuipers 2000, Chaps. 9–10, respectively).
Refinement makes it possible to account for the fact that one counterexample may
be less severe than another, e.g. in the sense that it is less idealized than the other.
In Kuipers (2000, Chap. 10) I have presented such a refined approach to empirical
progress and (nomic) truth approximation based on an underlying ternary similarity
relation between possibilities, that is, structures, and hence called a structurelikeness
relation. The relation “one structure is more similar to a third than another structure”
may in particular take the form “one structure is less idealized, relative to a still more
realistic structure, than another”. In this way it was possible to explicate the idea
of ‘truth approximation by idealization and concretization’.18 Of course, the point
of departure was then the strong claim, combining the inclusion and the exclusion
method in an extreme complementary way.
17 The latter has to be excluded, for it is not only assumed to be true, it would provide a circular explanation
of being the best theory. Moreover, opting for it would also amount to the conclusion that after all there was
nothing of interest in the original theory.
18 Idealization is an extremely important aspect of scientific theorizing, as for example Nowak (1980),
Cartwright (1983) and, more recently, Shaffer (2012) have argued and documented. My view on idealiza-
tion in relation to truth approximation is particularly guided by Leszek Nowak’s emphasis on successive
concretization, which can be explicated as aiming at truth approximation
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From the present two-sided perspective, the refined definitions of ‘closer to the
truth’ and ‘more successful’ seem to be primarily concretizations of the clauses corre-
sponding to the representation function of inclusion theories. In the refined inclusion
method new theories revise old theories by changing the models of the theories to
some extent, e.g. by taking new factors into account that have been neglected before.
The new models are claimed to be more similar to ‘the true ones’ than those before.
Hence, although the exclusion method may appeal to Popperian intuitions, revising
theories in the suggested refined way seems to reflect the representation part of sci-
entific common sense. Therefore, it is plausible to think that an adequate modeling
of scientific common sense has to take into account both intuitions. This is perfectly
possible from the present perspective: two-sided theories for which the basic clauses
are used for the exclusion subtheories, whereas the refined clauses are used for the
inclusion subtheories. In terms of Zwart (2001), this is a way of combining the (Pop-
perian) ‘content-approach’, with the ‘similarity approach’ to truth approximation, à la
Niiniluoto (1987) and Oddie (1986). One may even speculate that Lakatosian research
program thinking can be represented by such two-sided theories: progress is achieved
by revising the corresponding inclusion theorymore in particular by revising, e.g. con-
cretizing, auxiliary hypotheses, however within the boundaries of the corresponding
exclusion theory, forming the hard core. The suggested asymmetric way of dealing
with refinement may seem plausible, in the practice of science refinement occurs on
both sides. E.g. Einstein’s postulates refine, relative to Newton’s postulates, which
possibilities are excluded from being realizable.
Since it is perfectly possible to translate the refinement of themodel-side of theories
to their postulates, by taking suitable complements, leading to the refinement of the
postulate side, we prefer to conceive the refinement of truthlikeness of two-sided the-
ories primarily in a symmetric way (Kuipers, manuscript). In this symmetric version,
‘closer to the truth’ is, roughly, defined by requiring on both sides a larger truth-content
and a less problematic falsity-content, the latter in the sense that the falsity-content of
the one theory is, in terms of the structurelikeness relation, more similar to (part of)
the truth than the falsity-content of the other. From this symmetric version it is easy to
derive the above suggested asymmetric version by ‘idealizing’ the exclusion side in
order to get its basic version back. This can be done by assuming a ‘trivial’ similarity
relation. Finally, it turns out that ‘more successful’ can best be refined in a somewhat
weaker, but more plausible way than before, with the attractive consequence that the
Success Theorem remains unconditionally valid: truth approximation in the refined
sense entails at least as successfulness in the refined sense.
8.2 Quantification
It is important to note that ‘closer to the truth’ and ‘more successful’ in all forms
so far dealt with are partial order relations. Hence, even in the basic version theories
will frequently not be comparable in either direction. There are at least two plausible
way-outs. From a methodological point of view it seems important to have a strategy
to deal with cases of ‘divided success’, that is, when the one theory is more successful
in some respects and the other in other respects. The qualitative ideal suggests to try
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to apply in this situation a kind of ‘principle of dialectics’, that is: try to improve both
theories in one stroke. In other words, try to design a new theory, a synthesis, that
is and remains more successful than both, that is, try to achieve genuine empirical
progress, and hence, presumably, truth approximation with respect to both theories.
Another way to deal with the non-comparability problem is to design a quantitative
concretization, in the present context, to begin with of the basic version. In a finite
context it is even plausible to just count number of elements, leading to the quantita-
tive symmetric difference definition of ‘closer to the truth’, e.g. referring to the P-side
|(P∗,T)| ≤ |(P,T)|. However, as soon as one wants to differentiate between the
weight of ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ or if U is infinite, ad hoc elements, e.g. weighing
factors and other parameters, are unavoidable, witness Niiniluoto’s otherwise impres-
sive approach (Niiniluoto 1987). In Kuipers (manuscript) I nevertheless present a
general quantitative (two-sided basic) approach, viz. a so-called measure-theoretical
one. It is largely in the spirit of Kuipers (2000, Chap. 12). It leads almost always
to an ordering of two theories, however, with a non-deductive ‘success theorem’, in
terms of expectation values, about the relation between truth approximation and the
corresponding quantitative notion of empirical progress. But after sufficient confirma-
tion of the corresponding empirical progress hypothesis, the theorem will support the
abductive ‘closer to the truth’ conclusion substantially.
8.3 Stratification
The second important qualitative concretization of the basic version of the two-sided
approach deals with stratification in terms of an observational and a theoretical level.
It is more or less crucial for the realism/instrumentalism debate. In Kuipers (2014b) I
have already presented stratification for exclusion theories, in line with Kuipers (2000,
Chap. 9). It leads to some substantial weakening of the connection between empirical
progress and truth approximation, but the connection remains remarkable. In Kuipers
(manuscript) stratification for two-sided theories is elaborated. The crucial question
for both sides is to what extent ‘closer to the truth’ on the theoretical level is projected
on the observational level. Though formally similar, the possible exceptions have
different methodological impact for the two sides, due to the asymmetric nature of
evidence in the nomic context. Of course, stratification is also possible for the refined
and quantified versions of ‘closer to the truth’, with specific limits to its projection on
the observational level.
8.4 Inconsistent theories
Inconsistent two-sided theories, that is, theories whereM is not a subset of P and hence
some models are excluded by the postulates, may be based on good reasons for the
models as well as for the postulates. Such theories may well be very useful for truth
approximation. To begin with, starting with inconsistent theory <M, P> one may be
heading for a consistent theory <M∗, P∗> such that the latter is ‘side-wise’ closer to
the truth than the former. And even an inconsistent two-sided theory may be side-wise
closer to the truth than another one, and hence be a step in the direction of the truth.
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This is formally perfectly possible. However, the question is to what extent <M, P>
can still be meaningfully considered to be one theory, though inconsistent. How can
M and P still be substantially related, i.e., share more than the vocabulary, when the
models do not satisfy (all of) the postulates? Of course, one option is that the models
may satisfy some approximate version of the postulates or only the most fundamental
postulates. This is clearly something which needs to be investigated further.
I like to conclude with two other perspectives.
8.5 A monadic existential and a monadic nomic interpretation
The formal story with the above ‘nomic’ interpretation can easily be given a monadic
(existential) interpretation,19 in which the members of U represent Q-predicates.20 A
theory <M, P> now says that the members of M are instantiated and the members of
cP are not, i.e. a theory corresponds to a ‘partial or complete constituent’ in the standard
logical sense. However, not only a monadic existential interpretation is possible, but
also a monadic nomic interpretation: <M, P> is then assumed to be claiming that
it is nomically possible to instantiate the Q-predicates in M but not those in cP. The
periodic table of elements can be seen as an example of the first interpretation, but
even better of the latter.
8.6 Connection with belief revision
The main message of Kuipers (2014a)21 is that Sven Owe Hansson’s adaptation of
AGM-rules for belief base revision (BRR) provides adequate means to connect belief
revision with a very general form of basic truth approximation.22 From the perspective
of the present paper it is now not difficult to derive from that paper how revision of
two-sided theory<M, P> in the light of data theory<R, S> can be reconstructed as a
combination of expansion and retraction. Assuming both theories to be consistent, it is
easy to check that by contraction, i.e. weakening, of the claims of <M, P> as far as in
conflict with those of<R, S>, we get the two-sided revised theory<M∩S,P∪R>. By
successive expansion, i.e. strengthening, of the claims of this intermediate theory by the
extra claims of<R, S> relative to those of<M, P>we get<(M∩S)∪R, (P∪R)∩S>.
It is also not difficult to check that the final theory is not only more successful than
the original and the intermediate one (it is even maximally successful), but also that
it is even closer to the truth than both, assuming of course that the data theory is true:
R ⊆ T ⊆ S. Further investigation is needed to connect the refined version of two-sided
19 In Kuipers (2014a), see below, I have already mentioned this interpretation.
20 Carnap’s term for mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive predicates, arising from a set of primitive
predicates by all possible combinations of negated and unnegated ones.
21 A very general paper also inspired by Cevolani et al. (2011), but before realizing the liberating conse-
quences for nomic truth approximation, let alone its room for truth approximation by two-sided theories
connecting the model and the postulate views on theories.
22 And less complicated than the connectionwith belief set revision inAGM-style, as elaborated inKuipers
(2011).
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nomic truth approximation, suggested above, and a correspondingly refined version
of belief base revision.
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